Dietmar

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD Here is DSDT from Bios 4007 from 8. Dezember 2020 for the AMD board rog strix b450-f gaming ii Dietmar dsdt4007ORIRaw.7z

Hihi, I make small joke with the acpi.sys V2 where I did the Ryzen hack against AcpiArbCrackPRT in the morning. And voila, now pci.sys Debug gives output. Hm, can this mean, that the driver entry for pci.sys is never reached because the crash via AcpiArbCrackPRT happens before this? Microsoft (R) Windows Debugger Version 6.3.9600.17200 X86 Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Using NET for debugging Opened WinSock 2.0 Waiting to reconnect... Connected to target 192.168.2.104 on port 50000 on local IP 192.168.2.101. Connected to Windows XP 2600 x86 compatible target at (Sat Apr 9 00:58:19.572 2022 (UTC + 2:00)), ptr64 FALSE Kernel Debugger connection established. ************* Symbol Path validation summary ************** Response Time (ms) Location OK C:\Symbols ************* Symbol Path validation summary ************** Response Time (ms) Location OK C:\symbolssss Symbol search path is: C:\symbolssss Executable search path is: C:\Symbols Windows XP Kernel Version 2600 MP (1 procs) Checked x86 compatible Built by: 2600.xpsp.080413-2133 Machine Name: Kernel base = 0x80a02000 PsLoadedModuleList = 0x80b019e8 System Uptime: not available ************* Symbol Path validation summary ************** Response Time (ms) Location OK E:\binaries.x86fre\Symbols ************* Symbol Path validation summary ************** Response Time (ms) Location OK C:\Symbols ************* Symbol Path validation summary ************** Response Time (ms) Location OK C:\symbolssss OK C:\symbols OK C:\symbolss OK C:\symbolsss OK E:\binaries.x86fre\Symbols Deferred https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols Deferred srv* Closing open log file otto7 Opened log file 'otto7' Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance) nt!DbgBreakPoint: 80ac37e0 cc int 3 kd> bu pci!DriverEntry kd> g MM: Loader/HAL memory block indicates large pages cannot be used for 80100000->8012777F MM: Loader/HAL memory block indicates large pages cannot be used for 810A6000->8258AFFF MM: Disabling large pages for all ranges due to overlap Breakpoint 0 hit pci!DriverEntry: 8059fc96 8bff mov edi,edi 15: kd> g Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1045 Device:0xc621 = 0x4 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1095 Device:0x0640 = 0x4 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x1230 = 0x4 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7010 = 0x4 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x104b Device:0x0140 = 0x8 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1179 Device:0x0603 = 0x8 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7113 = 0x8 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x4978 Device:0x84c5 = 0x8 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1106 Device:0x3040 = 0x8 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x0e11 Device:0x1000 = 0x10 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x0e11 Device:0x2000 = 0x10 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1039 Device:0x0406 = 0x10 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x0482 = 0x4000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x0008 = 0x10 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1014 Device:0x0002 = 0x10 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1080 Device:0x0600 = 0x20 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1013 Device:0x1100 = 0x40 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10b9 Device:0x5219 = 0x80 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1c1c Device:0x0001 = 0x100 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1097 Device:0x0038 = 0x100 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x100b Device:0xd001 = 0x400 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x04a3 = 0x800 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10aa Device:0x0000 = 0x800 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x88d1 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1179 Device:0x0605 = 0x1000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1013 Device:0x1110 = 0x2000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1180 Device:0x0478 = 0x2000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1180 Device:0x0475 = 0x2000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1180 Device:0x0476 = 0x2000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1004 Device:0x0101 = 0x4000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1042 Device:0x1000 = 0x4000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x104c Device:0xac12 = 0x10000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1180 Device:0x0466 = 0x10000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1014 Device:0x0095 = 0x40000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x2418 = 0x40000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x2428 = 0x40000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x244e = 0x40000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x2448 = 0x40000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x122e = 0x80000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7000 = 0x80000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7110 = 0x80000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7600 = 0x80000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4747 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4754 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8901 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1013 Device:0x00d6 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x104c Device:0xac15 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x110b Device:0x0004 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1000 Device:0x000f = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x104c Device:0xac17 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1023 Device:0x9397 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4742 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4744 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4749 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4750 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4751 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4755 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4757 = 0x20400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4759 = 0x20400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c42 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c44 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c47 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c49 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c50 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c51 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x5654 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x5655 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x5656 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x121a Device:0x0003 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1045 Device:0xc861 SybSys:0x9300 SubVendor:0x107b = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1045 Device:0xc861 SybSys:0xc861 SubVendor:0x1045 = 0x400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x1231 = 0x1000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1273 Device:0x0002 = 0x1000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1014 Device:0x007d = 0x1000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1285 Device:0x0100 = 0x1000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1217 Device:0x6836 = 0x8000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1217 Device:0x6832 = 0x8000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1091 Device:0x07a0 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7800 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10c8 Device:0x8005 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10c8 Device:0x8006 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10c8 Device:0x0005 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10c8 Device:0x0006 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x102b Device:0x1001 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10dd Device:0x0100 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1095 Device:0x0646 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1095 Device:0x0670 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1095 Device:0x0648 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1011 Device:0x0026 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0xb154 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8904 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1106 Device:0x8598 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1106 Device:0x8605 = 0x20000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1179 Device:0x0609 = 0x40000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1014 Device:0x0047 = 0x40000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x102b Device:0x051b = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x102b Device:0x0520 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x102b Device:0x0521 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x102b Device:0x1025 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x102b Device:0x0525 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7121 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7123 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x7125 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x1132 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x9005 Device:0x0050 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x9005 Device:0x005f = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4752 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x474f = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x474d = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4753 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x474c = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x474e = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c4d = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c4e = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c52 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c53 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1023 Device:0x9880 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x00a0 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x00a1 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x00a3 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x00b0 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x00b1 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x00b3 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0100 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0101 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0102 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0103 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0120 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0121 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0122 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0123 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0150 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0151 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0152 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0153 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0200 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0201 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0202 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0203 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x12d2 Device:0x0018 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x12d2 Device:0x0019 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1013 Device:0x6003 = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x3d3d Device:0x000a = 0x80000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4158 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4354 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4358 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4554 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4758 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4c54 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8810 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8811 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8812 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8814 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8880 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x88b0 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x88c0 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x88c1 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x88d0 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x88f0 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x5333 Device:0x8902 = 0x100000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x0e11 Device:0xb109 = 0x200000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4342 = 0x8000000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4362 = 0x8000000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4371 = 0x8000000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x100c Device:0x3202 = 0x8a00 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1066 Device:0x8002 = 0x300000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1066 Device:0x0002 = 0x300000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1004 Device:0x0102 = 0x2004000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1045 Device:0xc814 = 0x20400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x4756 = 0x20400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1002 Device:0x475a = 0x20400000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x1161 = 0x1040000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x8086 Device:0x1461 = 0x1040000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1000 Device:0x000b = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0020 = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0028 = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x0029 = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x002a = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x002b = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x002c = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x002d = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x002e = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x10de Device:0x002f = 0xa0000000 Adding Hack entry for Vendor:0x1013 Device:0x00d6 SybSys:0x80d6 SubVendor:0x1018 = 0x0 Debug device @ Segment 0, 3.0.0 PCI - Unexpected status c0000034 from ZwQueryValueKey, expected STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (c0000023). PCI - Unexpected status c0000034 from ZwQueryValueKey, expected STATUS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL (c0000023). *** Assertion failed: IopInitHalResources == NULL *** Source File: d:\xpsp\base\ntos\io\pnpmgr\pnpinit.c, line 1455 Break repeatedly, break Once, Ignore, terminate Process, or terminate Thread (boipt)? i i *** Fatal System Error: 0x0000007b (0xBACC7518,0xC0000034,0x00000000,0x00000000) Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance) A fatal system error has occurred. Debugger entered on first try; Bugcheck callbacks have not been invoked. A fatal system error has occurred. Connected to Windows XP 2600 x86 compatible target at (Sat Apr 9 00:59:12.057 2022 (UTC + 2:00)), ptr64 FALSE Loading Kernel Symbols ................................... Loading User Symbols ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information. BugCheck 7B, {bacc7518, c0000034, 0, 0} Probably caused by : ntkrpamp.exe ( nt!IopMarkBootPartition+f5 ) Followup: MachineOwner --------- nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction: 80ac37ec cc int 3 0: kd> !analyze -v ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* INACCESSIBLE_BOOT_DEVICE (7b) During the initialization of the I/O system, it is possible that the driver for the boot device failed to initialize the device that the system is attempting to boot from, or it is possible for the file system that is supposed to read that device to either fail its initialization or to simply not recognize the data on the boot device as a file system structure that it recognizes. In the former case, the argument (#1) is the address of a Unicode string data structure that is the ARC name of the device from which the boot was being attempted. In the latter case, the argument (#1) is the address of the device object that could not be mounted. If this is the initial setup of the system, then this error can occur if the system was installed on an unsupported disk or SCSI controller. Note that some controllers are supported only by drivers which are in the Windows Driver Library (WDL) which requires the user to do a custom install. See the Windows Driver Library for more information. This error can also be caused by the installation of a new SCSI adapter or disk controller or repartitioning the disk with the system partition. If this is the case, on x86 systems the boot.ini file must be edited or on ARC systems setup must be run. See the "Advanced Server System Administrator's User Guide" for information on changing boot.ini. If the argument is a pointer to an ARC name string, then the format of the first two (and in this case only) longwords will be: USHORT Length; USHORT MaximumLength; PWSTR Buffer; That is, the first longword will contain something like 00800020 where 20 is the actual length of the Unicode string, and the next longword will contain the address of buffer. This address will be in system space, so the high order bit will be set. If the argument is a pointer to a device object, then the format of the first word will be: USHORT Type; That is, the first word will contain a 0003, where the Type code will ALWAYS be 0003. Note that this makes it immediately obvious whether the argument is a pointer to an ARC name string or a device object, since a Unicode string can never have an odd number of bytes, and a device object will always have a Type code of 3. Arguments: Arg1: bacc7518, Pointer to the device object or Unicode string of ARC name Arg2: c0000034, (reserved) Arg3: 00000000, (reserved) Arg4: 00000000 Debugging Details: ------------------ DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: DRIVER_FAULT BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7B PROCESS_NAME: System ANALYSIS_VERSION: 6.3.9600.17237 (debuggers(dbg).140716-0327) x86fre DPC_STACK_BASE: FFFFFFFFBACCC000 LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 80a30d7b to 80ac37ec STACK_TEXT: bacc7080 80a30d7b 00000003 bacc73dc 00000000 nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction bacc70cc 80a319e6 00000003 80085000 e12ec418 nt!KiBugCheckDebugBreak+0x19 bacc74ac 80a31f77 0000007b bacc7518 c0000034 nt!KeBugCheck2+0x574 bacc74cc 80d32863 0000007b bacc7518 c0000034 nt!KeBugCheckEx+0x1b bacc7634 80d380f6 80085000 00000000 80085000 nt!IopMarkBootPartition+0xf5 bacc7684 80d341f1 80085000 bacc76a0 00034000 nt!IopInitializeBootDrivers+0x53e bacc7830 80d31940 80085000 00000000 8a528da8 nt!IoInitSystem+0x82d bacc7dac 80bd81ac 80085000 00000000 00000000 nt!Phase1Initialization+0xb12 bacc7ddc 80ae4212 80d30e2e 80085000 00000000 nt!PspSystemThreadStartup+0x34 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 nt!KiThreadStartup+0x16 STACK_COMMAND: kb FOLLOWUP_IP: nt!IopMarkBootPartition+f5 80d32863 8d85e0feffff lea eax,[ebp-120h] SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 4 SYMBOL_NAME: nt!IopMarkBootPartition+f5 FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner MODULE_NAME: nt IMAGE_NAME: ntkrpamp.exe DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 4802b3ce IMAGE_VERSION: 5.1.2600.5512 FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: 0x7B_nt!IopMarkBootPartition+f5 BUCKET_ID: 0x7B_nt!IopMarkBootPartition+f5 ANALYSIS_SOURCE: KM FAILURE_ID_HASH_STRING: km:0x7b_nt!iopmarkbootpartition+f5 FAILURE_ID_HASH: {e710697b-9762-1225-4a06-575d839651e1} Followup: MachineOwner ---------

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD I have the same SHA-1 checksum for pci.sys (Debug) before modd as you and also the same SHA-1 checksum after modd exakt as you. But no output for PCI, only Acpi as before. May be the reason is the following: When I set a breakpoint via bu pci!DriverEntry the Bsod 0x7E (0xC0000005, xxx, yyy, zzz) happens before the compi breaks there Dietmar PS: I also check the Symbol path for the Debug and modded pci.sys. It is 805e8000 8060ef80 pci (pdb symbols) c:\symbolssss\sys\pci.pdb This is correct, because in C:\symbolssss folder I extract the Debug *.pdb. EDIT: What do you write in kd> line after Windbg starts?

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD I make a new folder for the XP SP3 Debug, here Symbolssss. Then I put the Debug pci.sys on the AMD compi and the (unmodded) Debug acpi.sys V2 also. Here is the txt output from Windbg. The ed Kd_PCI_Mask 0xFFFFFFFF gives no extra output. Also I noticed, that in the PCI files from Source is not a single function with "Tracename" in it Dietmar otto4AcpiPci.7z

@George King Yes, the problem is that on the Ryzen board some devices are not recogniced as PCI devices. And also Linux has big problems with this. The binary hack does the same as you mentioned. I think it is a hardware problem of the Ryzen cpu, I remember that they change in the Apic model, when the Irq is generated from the uprising flank to the downfalling (or vice versa) Dietmar

It just looks like, if something is not recogniced as PCI device on the Ryzen compi. *** Assertion failed: PciInterfacesInstantiated *** Source File: e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c, line 3512 and then also *** Assertion failed: pciInterface *** Source File: e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c, line 3518 Here is the Windbg output after Ryzen compi reached Breakpoint ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT: to ----------> Bsod 0x7E, (0xC0000005,xxx,yyy,zzz) Dietmar otto3.7z

@Damnation The register EDI is 0, so adress is 0x00000010. Question is, why EDI becomes 0 Dietmar

I make a try with Lan Windbg on this Ryzen board with the unpatched acpi.sys V2 "Debug". Not so much more information as before Dietmar *** Assertion failed: PciInterfacesInstantiated *** Source File: e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c, line 3512 Break repeatedly, break Once, Ignore, terminate Process, or terminate Thread (boipt)? i i *** Assertion failed: pciInterface *** Source File: e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c, line 3518 Break repeatedly, break Once, Ignore, terminate Process, or terminate Thread (boipt)? i i PS: Unhandled Kernel Mode Exception Pointers = 0xBACC69DC Code c0000005 Addr BA74CBE4 Info0 00000000 Info1 00000010 Info2 00000010 Info3 8A332500 *** Fatal System Error: 0x0000007e (0xC0000005,0xBA74CBE4,0xBACC6E90,0xBACC6B8C) Break instruction exception - code 80000003 (first chance) A fatal system error has occurred. Debugger entered on first try; Bugcheck callbacks have not been invoked. A fatal system error has occurred. Connected to Windows XP 2600 x86 compatible target at (Fri Apr 8 14:54:11.026 2022 (UTC + 2:00)), ptr64 FALSE Loading Kernel Symbols ........................... Loading User Symbols ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* Use !analyze -v to get detailed debugging information. BugCheck 7E, {c0000005, ba74cbe4, bacc6e90, bacc6b8c} *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 Probably caused by : ACPI.sys ( ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+f8 ) Followup: MachineOwner --------- nt!RtlpBreakWithStatusInstruction: 80ac37ec cc int 3 0: kd> !analyze -v ******************************************************************************* * * * Bugcheck Analysis * * * ******************************************************************************* SYSTEM_THREAD_EXCEPTION_NOT_HANDLED (7e) This is a very common bugcheck. Usually the exception address pinpoints the driver/function that caused the problem. Always note this address as well as the link date of the driver/image that contains this address. Arguments: Arg1: c0000005, The exception code that was not handled Arg2: ba74cbe4, The address that the exception occurred at Arg3: bacc6e90, Exception Record Address Arg4: bacc6b8c, Context Record Address Debugging Details: ------------------ *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 *** No owner thread found for resource 80afd640 EXCEPTION_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - Die Anweisung "0x%08lx" verweist auf Speicher bei "0x%08lx". Die Daten wurden wegen eines E/A-Fehlers in "0x%081x" nicht in den Arbeitsspeicher bertragen. FAULTING_IP: ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+f8 [e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c @ 3535] ba74cbe4 ff5710 call dword ptr [edi+10h] EXCEPTION_RECORD: bacc6e90 -- (.exr 0xffffffffbacc6e90) ExceptionAddress: ba74cbe4 (ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+0x000000f8) ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation) ExceptionFlags: 00000000 NumberParameters: 2 Parameter[0]: 00000000 Parameter[1]: 00000010 Attempt to read from address 00000010 CONTEXT: bacc6b8c -- (.cxr 0xffffffffbacc6b8c;r) eax=bacc7070 ebx=00000000 ecx=0000bb40 edx=00000056 esi=8a2f8660 edi=00000000 eip=ba74cbe4 esp=bacc6f58 ebp=bacc70a0 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na pe nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010286 ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+0xf8: ba74cbe4 ff5710 call dword ptr [edi+10h] ds:0023:00000010=???????? Last set context: eax=bacc7070 ebx=00000000 ecx=0000bb40 edx=00000056 esi=8a2f8660 edi=00000000 eip=ba74cbe4 esp=bacc6f58 ebp=bacc70a0 iopl=0 nv up ei ng nz na pe nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010286 ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+0xf8: ba74cbe4 ff5710 call dword ptr [edi+10h] ds:0023:00000010=???????? Resetting default scope PROCESS_NAME: System ERROR_CODE: (NTSTATUS) 0xc0000005 - Die Anweisung "0x%08lx" verweist auf Speicher bei "0x%08lx". Die Daten wurden wegen eines E/A-Fehlers in "0x%081x" nicht in den Arbeitsspeicher bertragen. EXCEPTION_PARAMETER1: 00000000 EXCEPTION_PARAMETER2: 00000010 READ_ADDRESS: 00000010 FOLLOWUP_IP: ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+f8 [e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c @ 3535] ba74cbe4 ff5710 call dword ptr [edi+10h] BUGCHECK_STR: 0x7E DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID: NULL_CLASS_PTR_DEREFERENCE ANALYSIS_VERSION: 6.3.9600.17237 (debuggers(dbg).140716-0327) x86fre DPC_STACK_BASE: FFFFFFFFBACCC000 LOCK_ADDRESS: 80afd6c0 -- (!locks 80afd6c0) Resource @ nt!IopDeviceTreeLock (0x80afd6c0) Shared 1 owning threads Threads: 8a328020-01<*> 1 total locks, 1 locks currently held PNP_TRIAGE: Lock address : 0x80afd6c0 Thread Count : 1 Thread address: 0x8a328020 Thread wait : 0xcf LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER: from 80a30d7b to 80ac37ec STACK_TEXT: bacc70a0 ba78cf2a 8a2f8660 bacc70cc bacc70e0 ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+0xf8 [e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c @ 3535] bacc70d4 ba79c367 ba782f00 bacc70f0 e12b4624 ACPI!AcpiArbAddAllocation+0x9d [e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c @ 1474] bacc7158 ba78bc7d e10089a0 e12b4624 ba782f00 ACPI!ArbBootAllocation+0xf5 [e:\nt\base\ntos\arb\arbiter.c @ 1406] bacc716c ba79c3de ba782f00 e12b4624 e12b4624 ACPI!AcpiArbBootAllocation+0x49 [e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c @ 1850] bacc7188 80b6c111 ba782f00 00000009 bacc71a8 ACPI!ArbArbiterHandler+0x52 [e:\nt\base\ntos\arb\arbiter.c @ 1562] bacc71c4 80b6d093 bacc71b8 00000000 80afd1c0 nt!IopBootAllocation+0xbb bacc7208 80b6d80b 00000004 e1008950 e101a170 nt!IopAllocateBootResourcesInternal+0xc5 bacc7228 80d38c8b 00000004 8a2f8660 e101a170 nt!IopAllocateBootResources+0x75 bacc724c 80b5653a 00000004 8a2f8660 e101a170 nt!IopReportBootResources+0x65 bacc727c 80b5cb93 8a2e6598 800005e4 00000001 nt!PiQueryAndAllocateBootResources+0x150 bacc736c 80b5d26d 8a2e6598 00000000 00000000 nt!PipProcessNewDeviceNode+0xc9d bacc75c4 80a2cff0 8a33ec80 00000000 00000000 nt!PipProcessDevNodeTree+0x1bd bacc7608 80a2d2fb 00000000 00000000 80090f18 nt!PipDeviceActionWorker+0xc4 bacc7620 80d37f53 00000000 00000006 00000000 nt!PipRequestDeviceAction+0x13b bacc7684 80d341f1 80085000 bacc76a0 00034000 nt!IopInitializeBootDrivers+0x39b bacc7830 80d31940 80085000 00000000 8a328020 nt!IoInitSystem+0x82d bacc7dac 80bd81ac 80085000 00000000 00000000 nt!Phase1Initialization+0xb12 bacc7ddc 80ae4212 80d30e2e 80085000 00000000 nt!PspSystemThreadStartup+0x34 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 nt!KiThreadStartup+0x16 FAULTING_SOURCE_LINE: e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c FAULTING_SOURCE_FILE: e:\nt\base\busdrv\acpi\driver\nt\irqarb.c FAULTING_SOURCE_LINE_NUMBER: 3535 FAULTING_SOURCE_CODE: 3531: &classCode, 3532: &subClassCode, 3533: &parent, 3534: &routingToken, > 3535: &flags); 3536: 3537: if (!NT_SUCCESS(status)) { 3538: return STATUS_NOT_FOUND; 3539: } 3540: SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX: 0 SYMBOL_NAME: ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+f8 FOLLOWUP_NAME: MachineOwner MODULE_NAME: ACPI IMAGE_NAME: ACPI.sys DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP: 624f31cb IMAGE_VERSION: 5.1.2600.1106 STACK_COMMAND: .cxr 0xffffffffbacc6b8c ; kb FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: 0x7E_ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+f8 BUCKET_ID: 0x7E_ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT+f8 ANALYSIS_SOURCE: KM FAILURE_ID_HASH_STRING: km:0x7e_acpi!acpiarbcrackprt+f8 FAILURE_ID_HASH: {30b13d1d-5098-59bf-2bca-ef183c89cfe1} Followup: MachineOwner ---------

Ryzen with serial mice Dietmar

@Damnation @Andalu And here ist acpi.sys V2 "free" with binary hack for Ryzen and for DDB fail Dietmar https://ufile.io/3u5xfmx3

@Damnation I remember the crazy search for this Bsod. I just kill ACPICrackPRT and this works also for Ryzen Dietmar https://ufile.io/4naa88ej

On the AMD board ROG-STRIX-B450-F-GAMING-II with Ryzen 3700x I get with new acpi.sys for generic XP and for Setup of XP BSOD 0x0000007E (0xC0000005, xxx, yyy, zzz) . acpi.sys 6666 (very last version) at Ramsey works Dietmar PS: This is the famous Ryzen crash in FAILURE_BUCKET_ID: 0x7E_ACPI!AcpiArbCrackPRT. So, still binary hack is needed for AMD Ryzen. I will try this now.

Nice new acpi.sys works also at once for NVME boot of XP SP3 (here Optane 900P) via generic XP, here on the Biostar z690A board Dietmar

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD After again crazy fight with compiler (I use only XP SP3 for everything) here are the new and tested acpi.sys files, "free" and "debug" version. This time without any binary hack ) Dietmar https://ufile.io/wvxclbkz

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD The whole output is about 7Mb from Windbg from the Asrock z690 extreme board. I run it until full XP SP3 desktop can be seen. No Bsod. No IDAPro modd in acpi.sys. No modd in DSDT. Full acpi output needs about 3 hours Dietmar 8989dbf9: { 8989dbf9: CreateQWordField(NBUF=Buffer(0x30){ 0x8a,0x2b,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x79,0x00},0xe,NBAS)AMLI:| | | | | ValidateArgTypes(pArgs=897720fc,ExpectedTypes=BI) AMLI:| | | | | ValidateArgTypes=0 8989dc04: CreateQWordField(NBUF=Buffer(0x30){ 0x8a,0x2b,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x79,0x00},0x16,NMAS)AMLI:| | | | | ValidateArgTypes(pArgs=897720fc,ExpectedTypes=BI) AMLI:| | | | | ValidateArgTypes=0 8989dc0f: CreateQWordField(NBUF=Buffer(0x30){ 0x8a,0x2b,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x79,0x00},0x26,NLEN)AMLI:| | | | | ValidateArgTypes(pArgs=897720fc,ExpectedTypes=BI) AMLI:| | | | | ValidateArgTypes=0 8989dc1a: Store(NHLAACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Entered with context 897720ac ACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Got lock immediately, Context 897720ac ACPIReleaseGlobalLock: Lock released by context 897720ac =0x6526c000,NBAS)AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget(pdataTarget=89772110,ExpectedType=DataObject,ppdata=ba55bcd4) AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget=0 (pdataTarget=89772160) =0x6526c000 8989dc23: Add(NHLAACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Entered with context 897720ac ACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Got lock immediately, Context 897720ac ACPIReleaseGlobalLock: Lock released by context 897720ac =0x6526c000,Subtract(NHLLACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Entered with context 897720ac ACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Got lock immediately, Context 897720ac ACPIReleaseGlobalLock: Lock released by context 897720ac =0x0,One,)AMLI:| | | | ValidateArgTypes(pArgs=8977227c,ExpectedTypes=II) AMLI:| | | | ValidateArgTypes=0 AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget(pdataTarget=897722a4,ExpectedType=DataObject,ppdata=ba55bcd4) AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget=0 (pdataTarget=897722a4) =0xffffffff,NMAS)AMLI:| | | | ValidateArgTypes(pArgs=897720fc,ExpectedTypes=II) AMLI:| | | | ValidateArgTypes=0 AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget(pdataTarget=89772124,ExpectedType=DataObject,ppdata=ba55bcd4) AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget=0 (pdataTarget=897721c8) =0x6526bfff 8989dc33: Store(NHLLACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Entered with context 897720ac ACPIAsyncAcquireGlobalLock: Got lock immediately, Context 897720ac ACPIReleaseGlobalLock: Lock released by context 897720ac =0x0,NLEN)AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget(pdataTarget=89772110,ExpectedType=DataObject,ppdata=ba55bcd4) AMLI:| | | | ValidateTarget=0 (pdataTarget=89772230) =0x0 8989dc3c: }8989AAA0 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseRecurse: Status = 00000103 AMLI: 89913020: AsyncEvalObject(\_SB.PC00.HDAS.SNDW._STA) AMLI: 89913020: \_SB.PC00.HDAS.SNDW._STA() 8989A840 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseCheckSta: Status = 00000103 AMLI: 89913020: AsyncEvalObject(\_SB.PC00.HDAS.UAOL._STA) AMLI: 89913020: \_SB.PC00.HDAS.UAOL._STA() 8989A5F8 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseCheckSta: Status = 00000103 8989A410 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseCheckSta: Status = 00000000 8989A410 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseRunMethod: Status = 00000000 8989A410 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseRecurse: Status = 00000000 AMLI: 89913020: AsyncEvalObject(\_SB.PC00.HDAS.RTKC._STA) AMLI: 89913020: \_SB.PC00.HDAS.RTKC._STA() 8982D7E8 ACPIBuildProcessRunMethodPhaseCheckSta: Status = 00000103 otto2.7z

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD After crazy fight with the compiler I succeed to build a new Debug acpi.sys V2 with ULONG ---> ULONG64 if (!(pfd->dwFieldFlags & FDF_BUFFER_TYPE) && (pfd->dwNumBits <= sizeof(ULONG64)*8)) And before I run a Windbg session with the looong output I try direct start and this acpi.sys works without any extra hack, nice Dietmar PS: Now I run Windbg with the looong txt output.

Here is new link https://ufile.io/qou218zx

Here is working acpi.sys V2 free build from Sources for XP SP1, XP SP2, XP SP3 Bit32 thanks to @Mov AX, 0xDEAD and @Skulltrail . Please test test test. For me, it works with really everything Dietmar AcpiV2free.7z

@Damnation The hack from @Skulltrail is a little bit more tricky. For the wrong type Buffer (should be Integer), the error is still recogniced but the error code has been changed to "all is ok". All the time before I wonder, how this hack works, now I understand. I dont know, what now happens in XP, if the device HDA works to full, how I can test this. In the Spoiler above you can see, which device is started and which not. For example, processor.sys does not work for the 12900k cpu, shows 24 times "unknown device" Dietmar

Yesssaaaa I succeed to boot XP SP3 on the Asrock z690 extreme board with 12900k cpu to desktop. First time, with the new acpi.sys V2 build from Sources for XP SP1 from @Mov AX, 0xDEAD and small hack thanks to @Skulltrail. In Device Manager one yellow questionmark is there for pci-to-pci-bridge for Name: Intel(R) PCI Express Root Port #9 - 7AB0 PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_7AB0&SUBSYS_00000000&REV_11\3&11583659&0&E8 DevNode 0x89539da8 for PDO 0x896af038 InstancePath is "PCI\VEN_8086&DEV_7AB0&SUBSYS_00000000&REV_11\3&11583659&0&E8" ServiceName is "pci" State = DeviceNodeDriversAdded (0x303) Code 12, means not enough resources. But now I understand, that this happens only because of the Realtek Lan card in that PCIe slot for Windbg. Previous State = DeviceNodeInitialized (0x302) Problem = CM_PROB_NORMAL_CONFLICT Dietmar PS: Until now it works only with the Debug Version of acpi.sys V2 so you need Windbg for this.

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD With the hack from @Skulltrail in acpi.sys V2 build from Sources I get now this output with Windbg Dietmar

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD "ACPIBusIrpQueryResourceRequirements doesn't have trace output, we can rely only on ACPIDevPrint() text output" Can the function ACPIBusIrpQueryResourceRequirements be modded for to have trace output, we have the Source Code! And if not, how to get the maximal information via txt output in Windbg from ACPIDevPrint() Dietmar PS: On my Asrock z370 k6 I modded the DSDT at the same place via If (OSYS >= 0x07D6) { So, this HDA device will not work under XP. But not easy to modd DSDT on newer Bios for XP, hard job. With the Hack mov edi, 0xC0140008=>mov edi, 0x00000000 from @Skulltrail at head of _ValidateArgTypes are there any bad side effects? If not, we can integrate this Hack into new acpi.sys V2.

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD Can the trace.c function also be used for the Acpi Bsod 0x000000A5 (0x00000002, xxx, 0x00000001(0), yyy) The "1" in this BSOD means: 1 : ACPI cannot convert the BIOS' resource list into the proper format. This probably represents a flaw in the BIOS' list encoding procedure. Which functions have to be set at this places, for 0x000000A5 (0x00000002, xxx, 0x00000001, yyy) and then later for 0x000000A5 (0x00000002, xxx, 0x00000000, yyy) via if ( !_stricmp(pszProcName, "VALIDATEARGTYPES") || !_stricmp(pszProcName, "VALIDATETARGET") || !_stricmp(pszProcName, "xxx") || !_stricmp(pszProcName, "yyy") ) Dietmar

@Mov AX, 0xDEAD I am very much interested in NDIS 6.x for Windows XP/2003. Especially for a driver for the Intel Lan i219 under XP. Because a lot of boards now on the market without Realtek RTL8111H or Intel <i219 network, but also still a lot of new boards with the i219 chip Dietmar